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A combination of the Turkic words "kyrg" (forty) and "-yz" (tribes) with the Persian 
suffix "-stan" (country) creating the meaning “Land of the forty tribes”; the name 
refers to the forty clans united by the legendary Kyrgyz hero, Manas. 
 
Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked country located in Central Asia: north of Tajikistan, east 
of Uzbekistan, west of China, and south of Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan means a land of 
Kyrgyz (Stan – land). Fifteen years ago the country was actually referred as the 
“island of democracy” and “Switzerland of Asia.”  This has all changed over the last 





Capital city Bishkek (called Frunze during the Soviet era) is located in the north, in 
the Chuy valley near the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border, at an altitude of approximately 
800 m (2624.67 feet), on the edge of the Ala-Too range, which is an extension of the 
Tien Shan mountain range. Bishkek is the largest city in the country with a 
population of 824,900.1 Manas International Airport in the outskirts of Bishkek was 
home to the U.S. air base established in December 2001 to support the Operation 
“Enduring Freedom” until June of 2014. Bishkek is also the administrative capital 
of Chuy Province. 
 
Bishkek, before becoming a capital city, was a fortified Silk Road stop on the 
caravan route under the Uzbek khans of large Quqon Khanate. It was then turned 
into a Russian garrison when Tsarist troops occupied the region in 1862. A large 
influx of ethnic Russians and later Slavs during the Russian and Bolshevik 
occupations developed the city and named it Peshpek. With about 70 percent of the 
population represented by Russians and Slavs the city missed indigenous historic 
attributes or traditional architecture making it more of a Russian and Soviet city. 
 
The city was later given the name Frunze after Mikhail Frunze, the Bolshevik troop 
commander of the Eastern Front, ordered the onslaught of thousands of local people 
who supported resistance. Commander Frunze was born in Peshpek and the city 
that ironically was named in his honor in 1926. 
 
Kyrgyz’s gratitude to the Russians, who gave pastoral nomadic Kyrgyz tribes and 
juz (traditional cast based clans) independence from Uzbek Quqon Khanate and 
then statehood within the Soviet Union, is expressed in preserving the monuments 
of the Soviet period: the Mikhail Frunze Museum, the Monument to the Martyrs of 
Revolution (in commemoration of Kyrgyz women who supported the Bolshevik 
																																								 																				






regime and organized the local mobilization in support of Red Army) built during 
the Soviet period; the Lenin Statue on Ala-Too Square in downtown Bishkek which 
was moved recently to a less prominent place still surprise tourists and please old 
residents of the capital. Many street names and locations also bear Soviet heritage. 
 
 
INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR 
 
August 31, 1991 is celebrated as Independence Day. Present day Kyrgyzstan was 
formed by the Bolsheviks in 1924, first as Kara- Kyrgyz (Kara means black) 
Autonomous province of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic after the area 
had been conquered by the Red Army in 1918. In 1926 it became Kyrgyz 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and only in late 1936 was given a status of a 
full fledged republic. 
 













Total: 198,500 sq km (slightly smaller than South Dakota) Water: 7,200 sq km 
Land: 191,300 sq km 
Border length with China: 858km 
Border length with Uzbekistan: 1,099 km 
Border length with Kazakhstan: 1,224 km 
Border length with Tajikistan: 870km 
 
 
SIGNIFICANT TOPOGRAPHIC FEATURES 
 
Mountain ranges cover over 93% of the country.  The Tian Shan (in Chinese means 
Heavenly Mountains), Pamir and Alay Mountain Ranges constitute most of 
Kyrgyzstan’s landscape. The country is rich in lakes, rivers and glaciers which 
provide abundant water resources for the country. Lake Issyk Kul is the famous 
tourist place in Central Asia. Song Kyl and Chatyr Kul are other major lakes; 
Naryn (535 km, longest river in Kyrgyzstan), Talas, Chuy, and Kara Darya are the 
longest rivers.  In the southern part of the country is the fertile soil and warm 
climate of the Ferghana Valley ideal for producing agricultural products.  The Chu 
and Talas Valleys are other areas of irrigated land. Nearly 5 percent of the 
country’s total geography is woodlands. Most of Kyrgyzstan’s area is above 1,000 m; 
average altitude is above 2,500 m; 40 percent is above 3,000 m; and the highest 





The climate of the country varies from sub-tropical at lower altitudes in the warm 
valleys, cooler continental in the mountainous valley and cold in the high peaks of 
the Tian Shan Mountains. The country’s geographic partition between north and 
south also offers a difference in temperature. The warmest areas in winter are in 
Osh province in the south of the country. The area to the north is Issyk-Kyl (means 
Hot Lake in Kyrgyz) have moderate cold averaging -5°C in the peak of winter from 
late December - January. 
 
The Ferghana Valley part of Kyrgyzstan is the warmest region with summer 
temperatures reaching up +35 °C in Osh and Jalal-Abad, and just a bit cooler in 
Batken. The Issyk-Kyl area never gets too hot attracting thousands of international 
																																								 																				






and local tourists to its positive health effects and pleasant summer climate. The 
Highland mountain regions have short summers where the temperature does not 
exceed +13°C, the long winter season lasts from November - March with lots of 





January 1 New Year 
March 8 International Women’s Day 
March 21-23 
Noorus (comes from ancient Zoroastrian 
tradition which many Central Asians 
take for an Islamic New Year) 
May 1 International Solidarity Day 
May 5 Constitution Day 
May 9 
Victory Day (until recently was 
celebrated as the Victory Day over Nazi 
Germany in WWII) 
August 31 Independence Day (from the USSR) 
 
The dates of two Islamic holidays Orozo Ait (Eid al-Fitr in Arabic, the feast of End 
of Ramadan) and Qurban Ait (Eid al-Adha in Arabic, the feast of the Sacrifice) 




• The official language is Kyrgyz, a Southern Turkic language which includes 
many Arabic and Persian words. There are two major dialects: one from the 
northern region and the other from the south. 
• Russian is widely used in Bishkek, among intelligentsia, political and 
business elites. It serves as the common language of communication between 
various ethnic groups. 
• Uzbek is spoken in Osh, Jalal-Abad and some areas of Batken provinces. 
• English is in big demand, particularly among the youth for educational and 





Kyrgyzstan has a legacy of high literacy achieved in Central Asia during 70 years of 






40,129 out of 3,090,680 people (population whose age was 15 years old and older) 
were illiterate.3 
 
Due to a lack of funding in the education sector, and low pay wages for teachers 
there is a shortage of teachers in both regular and vocational schools throughout the 
country. A 2007 report suggested the number of teachers was only 3,000 
nationwide.4 
 
NUMBER OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
From 1990 (a year before independence) to 2007 the number of academic institutes 
and universities had grown from 9 to 49, according to the National Statistics 
Committee.5 Since Kyrgyzstan allows private education almost one- third of higher 
education schools are privately owned. 33 schools are public and 16 are private 
(including foreign/international) institutes and universities. 
 
In the 2007-08 academic year 250,460 students were enrolled in 49 higher education 
schools throughout the country.6 The number of schools and students are high for 
such a small country. Students represent nearly 5 percent of total population (477 
students per 10,000 citizens). Forms of study include full-time, evening and distance 
learning taught by 14,400 teachers. Female students constituted 56.3 percent of all 
students. About 55,000 applicants are accepted in universities and institutes every 
year. 
 
In 2009 the number of higher education schools grew to 55. There have been 
concerns about the quality of private universities and institutes in particular where 
bribes for exams are widely known.7 A few university teachers in Osh and Bishkek 
admitted to taking bribes to survive due to low wages.8 Presently, the position of 
rector (president) of a prestigious university is among the most lucrative jobs in the 
country as they control the hierarchy of the bribe taking chain. 
 
																																								 																				
3 National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan. See Table in Russian: 5.03.00.19 Gramotnost’ 
naseleniya 
(po dannym perepisei naseleniya) (Literacy of population (according to census). Available at: 
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/education/5030019.pdf  
4 “Kuda dvizhetsa sistema obrazovaniya Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki?”(Where is the education system of 
Kyrgyz Republic moving to?), Emil Kanimetov, July 7, 2007. Available in Russian at: 
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1189112220  
5 See Table: 5.03.01.01 Chislo uchebnyx zavedeniy po vidam uchrishdenii (The number academic 
schools per level of education) available in Russian, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan at 
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/education/5030101.pdf  
6 See Table: 5.03.01.04 Chislo detei i uchashihsa po vidam uchrishdenii ( Number of children and 
students per level of education) available in Russian, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan at 
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/education/5030104.pdf  
7 The list of all 55 institutions in Russian is available at 
http://www.minedu.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=34  









The Ministry of Healthcare provides official statistics on healthcare indicators 
which show decline in the number of services including hospital beds, medical 
personnel and healthcare facilities.9 
 
HOSPITAL BEDS 
Number of Beds per 10,000 in Population10 
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 70.4 61.9 55.3 52.9 
Batken 64.3 61.3 56.0 49.8 
Jalal-Abad 62.2 54.8 47.3 45.7 
Issyk-Kul 53.8 36.1 31.8 29.9 
Naryn 59.9 57.8 34.3 31.6 
Osh 60.2 56.2 52.2 53.2 
Talas 58.8 55.8 40.0 27.3 
Chui 56.2 34.9 32.3 31.4 
Bishkek City 29.5 28.8 27.1 26.4 
Osh City -- -- -- 36.5 
 
DOCTORS 
Doctors of All Specialties (Including Dentists) per 10,000 in Population11 
Province 1996 2001 2002 2003 
Kyrgyzstan 32.9 27.2 26.0 25.7 
Bishkek City 46.2 30.7 28.7 30.1 
Osh City -- -- -- 25.2 
Chui Oblast 24.3 19.2 18.5 18.3 
Issyk-Kul 27.8 22.8 21.4 20.2 
Naryn 25.7 23.1 19.9 18.8 
Talas 25.0 20.8 19.4 18.7 
Osh 20.2 17.8 17.3 14.5 
Jalal-Abad 20.7 16.6 15.8 15.4 
Batken -- 16.3 15.7 15.4 
 
Due to deficiency in state’s funding in the healthcare sector and widespread 
poverty, access to private healthcare facilities resulted in increase of problems 
related to people’s health and well being, weakening confidence in the country’s 
																																								 																				
9 See Report of the Ministry of Healthcare of Kyrgyzstan on reform in healthcare, in English, at 
http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf  
10 Ibid, p. 14, Table 2-4. Total number of beds and number of beds per 10 000 population, by regions 
(indicator 1.2/3.2) at http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf  






health facilities. The mortality rate increased from 675.3 per 100,000 in 1999 to 
717.3 in 2003.12 The child and maternal mortality rates and other indicators are 
among highest in the former Soviet Union zone. Babies, children and women while 
in hospitals in southern cities of Osh and Nookat were infected with HIV via tainted 
blood and the reuse of needles. 
 
As reported in U.S. press in April of 2008, 72 children and 16 mothers were infected 
with HIV due to professional negligence in the Osh and Nookat state hospitals. This 
illustrates the alarming state of affairs in the health sector.  The government does 
not provide free treatment for mother victims and only pays $29.00 to parents of 
infected children for treatment.13 
 
According to the healthcare minister Marat Mabetov, Kyrgyzstan lacks almost 50 





As of 2015: 
Total Population: 5,930,000 
Urban population: 2,117,000 
Rural residents: 3,813,00015 
 
Ethnic Composition of Population (January 2008)16 
Ethnic Group Number of People (in thousands) Percentage from Total 
Armenian 1,1 0.0 
Azerbaijan 16,4 0.3 
Belarus 1,8 0.0 
Chechen 2,5 0.1 
Dungan (Muslims of 60,3 1.2 
																																								 																				
12 Ibid, Table 1.6. Indicator 6: Leading causes of mortality, including mortality rate per 100000 
population and percent of total mortality attributable to each cause. Available at: 
http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf  
13 For instance read: Associated Press, April 9, 2008, ‘Kyrgyz mothers catching HIV from babies: 
After contracting virus in hospitals, infants pass disease by breast-feeding’ at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24034536/  
14 “Marat Mambetov: Zdravooharanenie v Kyrgyzstane ispytyvaet pochti 50-ii protsentnyi defetsit 
kadrov” (Marat Mambetov: Healthcare in Kyrgyzstan experiences almost 50 percent lack of cadres), 
Information Agency “24.kg,” May 29, 2009. Available in Russian at: 
http://www.paruskg.info/?p=10398  
15 The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/countries/KG?display=graph  
16 According to the National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan. See Table: ‘Kalktyn Uluttyk 








Georgian 0,6 0.0 
German 11,5 0.2 
Jewish 0,6 0.0 
Kazakh 38,9 0.7 
Korean 18,2 0.4 
Kyrgyz 3,616,5 8.7 
Tajik 48,0 0.9 
Tatar 35,0 0.7 
Turkmen 0,5 0.0 
Turk 36,4 0.7 
Uighur 51,2 1.0 
Ukrainian 25,3 0.5 
Uzbek 754,5 14.5 
Others 32,6 0.9 





Kyrgyz are the dominant ethnic group in the country estimated at 3,616,500 or 69.2 
percent of population as of January 2008,17 Krygyzs represented 71 percent of the 
population in 2013. The nation is predominantly Sunni Muslim of Hanafi School of 
Jurisprudence. There are traditional kin-based and regional cleavages beneath the 
modern structure of the Kyrgyz society which dominate the political culture and 
explain the trajectory of events. 
 
KYRGYZ CLAN NETWORKS 
Kyrgyz people received statehood only after the arrival of Russian Bolshevik 
administration. It divided the territory ruled by Central Asian Khanates along the 
ethnic lines resulting in creation of an autonomous republic in 1926. In 1936 it 
became a full-fledged member of the union of 15 Soviet states. Disjoined nomadic 
tribal group identities were represented in the pre-Soviet period rather than one 
unified national identity. 
 
The outcomes of the Tulip Revolutioned reveal the significance of clanship and 
political culture.  A wished overthrow of the Akaev’s old corrupt and nepotistic 
network and the re-installment of another clan occurred when the more vicious 
group of Bakiev’s family members and friends came to power and redistributed 
resources. 
																																								 																				
17 According to the National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan the total population was estimated 
5,224,300. See Table: ‘Kalktyn Uluttyk Kuramy’ (national composition of population) available in 







Although tribal or regional affiliations might not matter in relation to various 
issues of everyday life, they are important for politicians in Bishkek. Igor Chudinov 
believes his ethnicity (Russian) was an important factor when he was appointed as 
Prime Minister: “I’ll say openly: I am the least one in this country under the 
influence of local clans and regional groupings.”   Most Kyrgyz are attached to 
certain regional and tribal groupings. Slavs, who migrated to the country during the 
Soviet period, have no local roots and are considered neutral in local rivalries and 
are regarded as good professionals. 
 
Today kin based clanship and regionalism, important elements of political culture of 
Kyrgyz, still exist and play a significant role in political life in the rivalry for access 
to economic assets. To residents of rural areas the extended family is still an 
important part of self-identity, less so for urbanized Kyrgyz. 
 
Clanship 
Kyrgyz are divided into three major tribal confederations as follows: 
 
Sol kanat Ichkilik Ong kanat 
The Left Wing, 
also called “Arkalyk” 
Internal 
The Right Wing, 
also called “Otuz Uul” 
 
According to the North, tribal groupings are informally associated with: 
 
Northerners Southerners Southerners 
7 tribes in the north and 
west of the country: 








This group includes 
several tribes, some of 
which were not of ethnic 
Kyrgyz origin (for instance 
Kypchaks) but 
have assimilated with 
ethnic Kyrgyz and now 
view themselves as 
Kyrgyz. They reside in 
Osh, Batken, and parts of 
Jalal –Abad provinces in 
the south. 
Has fewer and smaller 
tribes than the north. 
Geographically based in 
Jalal-Abad and partially 
Osh provinces of southern 
part of the country. 
Each of the seven has a 
dominant characteristic, 
and all have fought each 
other for influence. 
Majority of the country’s 
leaders, including Askar 
Akaev came from 
Southern Osh province had 5 governors from the 
northern part of the country appointed by Akaev. 
Former president’s frequent reshuffling of northern 
governors, who were perceived by southerners as rivals 
against the southerners coming to extract resources for 







the Sarybagysh clan. 
 
Sarybagysh clan in 
Akayev’s government 




Minister of Finance, 
From Akayev’s village and 
clan; Tashtemir Aitbaev, 





Secretary of State; Bolot 
Dzhanuzakov, 
Chairman of National 
Security Service; Amanbek 
Karypkulov, Chief of 
Presidential Staff. 
During Akaev era prominent public figures and MPs 
Azimbek Beknazarov, Adahan Madumarov, Omurbek 
Tekebaev, Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, Masaliev, Bekturn 
Asanov and Alisher 
Abdimomjunov all have ties with Ichkilik clans based 
in Osh, Jalalabad or Batken regions in the south. Once 
Prime Minister, under Akaev, and current president 
Bakiev is also an Ichkilik southerner. 
 
A group of Kypchaks, a Turkic sub-ethnic group within Kyrgyz, demanded a 
separate status of nationality as a sovereign ethnic group during the national 
census conducted in Kyrgyzstan in March – April of 2009. Kypchaks, once a 
powerful confederation of pastoral steppe tribes and brave warriors, migrated to 
Central Asia from the Irtysh River basin. They constitute a sub-ethnic group either 
within larger Kyrgyz or Kazakh ethnic groups. The Kypchak language is lost and 
they speak the language of the dominant ethnicity of the locality: Kyrgyz in 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh in Kazakhstan and Uzbek in Uzbekistan. Today most of 
Kypchaks reside in the Ferghana Valley. 
 
North-South Regional Divide 
High mountainous landscapes divide the Chuy, Talass, Issyk-Kul and Naryn 
provinces in the north from Osh, Bakten and Jalal-Abad provinces in the south. The 
two regions of the country are linked by the Bishkek – Osh road.  Costly flights run 
daily between the two major cities and less frequent flights between Bishkek to 
Batken and Jalal-Abad cities. Despite comparatively new unifying common ethnic 
identity, the differences in historical, political and economic developments impact 
relationships between regional and kinship affiliations. The Bolsheviks did not 






to Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political battle of the former 
nomadic horse shepherds in the north which undergone forceful urbanization and 
embraced Russification against the settled tribes of the agricultural south, where 
Islam and close interaction with Uzbek and Tajik cultures had a significant 
influence, reemerged and the appearance of little known Askar Akaev became a 
result of an inter-regional political settlement. 
 
North and South have their regional dialects of Kyrgyz language. 
 
MAJOR ETHNIC MINORITIES 
Uzbeks 
Ethnic Uzbeks represent 14.5 percent of the total population. Uzbeks constitute the 
majority of important southern cities such as Osh, Kar-Suu and Jalal – Abad. 
Uzbeks were the largest indigenous minority since the region was under the Uzbek 
Qoqon Khanate until the Bolsheviks divided the major local ethnic groups into 
separate republics but the borders were drawn with a high degree of planned 
arbitrariness. 
 
Inter-ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz which erupted in June of 1990 in 
the Osh province resulted in nearly 1,000 casualties, most of whom were Uzbeks. 
Sponsored by the KGB, which tried to instigate inter-ethnic conflicts to regain 
control of the colonies, Kyrgyz nationalists organized violent attacks on Uzbeks 
with the epicenter in Uzgen, an ancient Uzbek city. Violence was characterized by 
brutality towards women, children and the elderly. This event planted the seeds of 
mistrust between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south. Although there is status 
quo in relationship between the two it is more fragile than it may appear on the 
surface. 
 
Since Kurmabek Bakiev assumed the presidency, arrests and kidnappings of ethnic 
Uzbeks allegedly linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir and IMU by the National Security of 
Uzbekistan with permission of the Kyrgyz authorities have increased and have led 
to at least two killings of prominent Uzbeks. These developments along with the 
underrepresentation of Uzbeks in the government and in law enforcement add to 
the level of tensions between two ethnic groups. 
 
Russians 
Currently, less than a half million ethnic Russians reside in Kyrgyzstan while in 
1999 they numbered 603, 201.18 During the years of independence every third 
Russian (or nearly 700,000) left the country. Most Russians (Slavs in general) reside 
in major cities, primarily Bishkek and Osh. 
The first wave of emigration started in 1989 and in the early years of independence 
in the early 1990s. The inter-ethnic clashes in the Ferghana Valley during 
																																								 																				







Gorbachov’s political relaxation period, although not anti-Russian, raised fear 
among Russian Diaspora which forced more than 100,000 Russians to leave 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
With independence most government positions were transferred to ethnic Kyrgyz 
and many Russians realized their dominant status was lost.  Anti- Russian 
statements by Kyrgyz nationalists on the community level made Russians feel 
threatened politically and sometimes physically which contributed to departure of 
thousands of ethnic Russians and Slavs from the country. However, high 
unemployment and low wages became the major factor of the second wave of 
emigration which started in the late 1990s. Worsening socio- economic conditions, 
corruption, police abuse and lack of employment opportunities continue motivating 
many Russians to depart the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 
Kyrgyz - Russian relations are usually stable and positive. Closer relations between 
the two states were solidified by the closer of the U.S. air base at Manas 
International Airport which was aimed at receiving economic compensation from 
Russia. 
 
In comparison with Uzbekistan the Kyrgyz government has tried to preserve 
Russian Diaspora which consisted of highly trained professionals the country lacked 





Ethnic Kyrgyz constitute the majority of population and the second largest ethnic 
group Uzbeks are both Sunni Muslims of Hanafi School of Jurisprudence. Ethnic 
Russians belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. 
 
Nominally Muslim nomadic tribes of Kyrgyz, more in the past than at present, also 
practiced their ancient local religious traditions, including shamanism, which were 
at odds with Islam. Kyrgyz in the south are generally more religious than in the 
north due to the influence of the Uzbeks and Tajiks of the Ferghana valley. 
Although Quqon Khanate ruled from 1710 to 1876 over all Kyrgyz tribes the 
modern southern Kyrgyzstan is geographically closer to the capital of the Khanate 
in the Ferghana Valley city of Quqon. In recent years the north has seen an 
increase in the percentage of Kyrgyz who have strong religious sentiments towards 
Islam in comparison with previous years. The Central Mosque in capital Bishkek is 
overcrowded at Friday prayers and now donations are being collected for 
construction of a new mosque for 10,000 worshipers in the capital. Many mosques 
have been built in other cities in the north during the independence. Uzbeks, 
residing in the south, have traditionally been religious and are viewed by Kyrgyz 






with its center city of Osh was an epicenter of anti-Bolshevik resistance in 1920s. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union Western Evangelist Christian missionaries, 
mostly from America, descended on the Kyrgyz soil in an effort to recruit converts 





The country is divided into 7 provinces19 which are subdivided into rayons. Rayons 
are districts similar to counties in the United States; each rayon has its own 
administrative center. 
 
Rural areas consist of town type villages (in Russian: posolok gorodskogo tipa) and 
ayil keneshi (union of several rural settlements20) which are administered by ayil 
ökmötu (village administration). 
 
Each province has a capital. Capital Bishkek and Osh City represent separate 
administrative units also being capital cities of provinces giving them  special 
status. Osh city is also often called “the southern capital.” 
 
Map of Administrative Units21 
 
No. Administrative Unit Area (sq. km.) Capital City 
1 Bishkek City 115,700 heactares 
(0.1 sq. km.) 
--- 
2 Batken Province22 
17,000 
(8.5% of total 
territory) 
Batken 
3 Chuy Province 20,200 Bishkek 
																																								 																				
19 Province in Kyrgyz is called oblast, a loanword from Russian. 
20 In Russian: selskiy naselonyi punkt. 
21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_Kyrgyzstan  
22 Until 1999 Batken province was a part of Osh oblast until IMU incursions into Kyrgyzstan 







4 Jalal-Abad Province23 
37,700 
(16.9% of total 
territory) 
Jalal-Abad 
5 Naryn Province 
45,200 
(25% of total 
territory) 
Naryn 
6 Osh Province 29,200 Osh24 
7 Talas Province 
11,400 
(5.7% of total 
territory) 
Talas 
8 Issyk Kul Province 
43,100 





Map of Provinces and District of Kyrgyzstan25 
 
 
Corresponding Districts within Each Province on the Map: 
 




1. Aksy (Kerben), 2. Ala-Buka (Ala-Buka), 3. Bazar-Korgon 
(Bazar-Korgon), 4. Chatkal (Kanysh-Kyya), 5. Nooken 
(Massy), 6. Suzak (Suzak), 7. Toguz-Toro (Kazarman), 8. 
																																								 																				
23 From 1959 to 1990 was part of Osh province. 










1. Bakay-Ata (Leninpol), 2. Kara-Buura (Kyzyl-Adyr), 3. 




1. Ak-Suu (Karakol), 2. Ieti-Ögüz (Kyzyl-Suu), 3. Tong 
(Bökönbaev), 4. Tüp (Tüp), 5. Ysyk-Köl (Cholpon-Ata) 
Naryn Naryn 
1. Ak-Talaa (Baetov), 2. At-Bashy (At-Bashy), 3. Jumgal 
(Chaek), 4. Kochkor (Kochkor), 5. Tyan-Shan (Naryn) 
Chüy Bishkek 
1. Alamüdün (Lebedinovka), 2. Chüy (Chüy), 3. Jayyl 
(Kara-Balta), 4. Kemin (Kemin), 5. Moskva (Belovodskoe), 
6. Panfilov (Kayyngdy), 7. Sokuluk (Sokuluk), 8. Ysyk-Ata 
(Kant) 
Osh Osh 
1. Alay (Gülchö), 2. Aravan (Aravan), 3. Chong-Alay 
(Daroot-Korgon), 4. Kara-Kulia (Kara-Kulia), 5. Kara-Suu 
(Kara-Suu), 
6. Nookat (Eski-Nookat), 7. Özgön (Özgön) 
Batken Batken 
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OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES 
Kyrgyzstan, which in the recent past was called an “island of democracy”, had more 
than 100 registered political parties and movements before last parliamentary 
elections in December of 2007. Easy party registration laws allowed people to 
organize political groups of various orientations. Many parties had small 
membership while others were even unknown by the general public. Many parties 
critical of the executive branch had representation in the legislation. 
 
The recent amendment to the Constitution states that parliament members are 
elected on the party lists basis for 5 year terms. 
 
• Ak-Jol Eldik Partiyasi: Ak-Jol (literally translates as white road or bright 
path) and Eldik Partiyasi means people’s party). Short form used: Ak-Jol. 
The party was created in 2007 by the merger of Ata –Jurt (Fatherland), El 
Kelechegi (Great Future), Menin Olkom (My Country), Republican Party of 
Labor and Unity, and a few smaller parties informally headed by President 
Bakiev. Bakiev resigned from his official chairmanship of the party because 
officially the head of the executive branch cannot be a member of a political 
party. President Bakiev was involved in establishing a new party which 
would be loyal to the leader of the country who faced growing disagreement 
with the legislative branch. 
 






was dissolved in 2007 by the president and his party received 71 seats out of 
90 at the last parliamentary elections in December of 2007 which were 
criticized by international and local observers for breaching the international 
elections norms. 
 
Many local and international experts view Bakiev’s efforts in creating a party based 
parliament with a strong pro-president presence in the legislation as a way to 
politically weaken traditionally independent Jogorku Kenesh and minimize the 
presence of influential parties critical of the government. The victory of Ak- Jol 
Party at the 2007 elections was a successful step in strengthening the power of the 
executive branch. 
 
President Bakiev’s justification for creation of a new party was announced at the 
Ak-Jol party founding ceremony speech in October of 2007: “In the best cases, they 
simply criticize the authorities for their mistakes. But who will, who should, take 
care of affairs? Which political forces [or] political parties have done real work, have 
made progress toward those goals that stand before the country? Up until today, 
there haven't been any."26 
 
In reality, considering the development of political events in the country, it is 
obvious that the example of the Russian former president Putin’s domination in the 
Duma through “Unified Russia” Party is a motivation for legal changes in the 
election of parliamentarians. 
 
As of 2015 the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan holds 38 seats in 
Parliament, or 27.4 percent of the vote. 
 
Jany Kyrgyzstan (New Kyrgyzstan) Party faces a split among those who call for 
support of President Bakiev and those who are inclined to support opposition. 
 
 
BANNED RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND PARTIES 
According to the constitution, Kyrgyzstan is a secular state and no parties based on 
religious platform may function legally, regardless whether they use violent or 
peaceful means. 
 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) 
The party’s goal is rebuilding the single Islamic Khilafah State (Caliphate) through 
propagation and peaceful transformation of Muslim society and finally establishing 
‘Islamic household.’27  The radical party which is predominantly Sunni, with Islam 
																																								 																				
26 “Kyrgyz President Aims to Build Ruling Party,” October 17, 2007, RFE/RL, Bruce Pannier, 
available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078973.html  






as an ideology, does not employ violent means but Central Asian governments have 
accused HT in terrorism. 
 
HT is anti-Western, anti-Semitic, anti-secular, considers democracy a Kufr system, 
and calls for the overthrow of Muslim governments which do not obey the party’s 
vision of the Islamic governance and according to them, the country is currently a 
‘Kufr household.’28 
 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members first appeared in Central Asia in mid-1990s in Uzbekistan. 
The massive arrest campaign launched by the government aftermath of the 
Tashkent February 1999 bombings brought the party into the spotlight, which has 
been unknown for Central Asians. The government blamed IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
but arrested not only alleged members of these organizations but anybody who 
regularly attended prayers and was known for religious piety. Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s 
regular members openly criticized the unpopular government of Karimov and did 
not accept the offer from President Karimov for pardon. This gesture won the 
respect of many people who might not have shared the ideology of the organization 
but agreed with critical statements towards the ruling regime. 
 
Although the party claims to be peaceful some members left the party and either 
joined the militant movements or created their separate cells (not associated with 
HT) which use violence. The organization is banned in all Central Asian states. 
 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, despite its popularity in early stages of its appearance in Central 
Asia, failed to become a popular movement due to highly secretive recruitment, 
heavy repressions, little interest among populace in political Islam and theological 
discrepancies with mainstream Islamic doctrine called Aqidah in Arabic.  
Differences in doctrine of Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama‘ah (majority of Muslims) and of 
HT is a significant obstacle for broad public support and recruitment of new 
members, particularly among religiously educated Muslims. Regular members are 
more preoccupied with political work, despite religious rhetoric, that makes some 
believe they are a purely religious organization. The frequency and quantity of 
leaflet distribution among the populace in the region has been decreasing and the 
number of arrests of alleged members of HT has decreased, which indicates the 
party has lost ground in Central Asia. 
 
Traditionally, HT was popular among ethnic Uzbeks; besides Uzbekistan the 
organization was also active in the border areas of neighboring counties populated 
by ethnic Uzbeks. Currently the group is most active in Kyrgyz and Tajik sections of 
the Ferghana Valley and the southern regions of Kazakhstan. 
 
HT in Kyrgyzstan: An Aggressive Public Diplomacy 








A significant conflict between the authorities and HT occurred in the city of Nookat 
in southern Kyrgyzstan on October 1, 2008 when locals celebrated Islamic religious 
holiday Orozo Ait but the government suddenly refused to provide the center of the 
city for festivities and charity which traditionally have been held every year. The 
government’s refusal to allow public celebration led to a peaceful rally to the district 
administration building and then turned into mass riots. The security forces 
launched mass arrests: 32 individuals (25 ethnic Uzbeks and 7 ethnic Kyrgyz) had 
been arrested and 90 more people are on the government wanted list. Surprisingly 
the authorities included children of 10 and even 4 years old and elderly who are 71, 
74 and even 81 years old. Human rights organizations claim the police used torture 
during investigation and demanded money for release among many other violations 
of human rights.29 
 
The reason behind government’s ban on publicly celebrating Orozo Ait was fear that 
HT would exploit this holiday for its pubic relations campaign when the party 
members provide free meal to poor and agitate masses to join the organization and 
change the government. In Kyrgyzstan’s more liberal conditions then in other states 
of the region HT utilized the opportunity to propagate its ideas more ambitiously. 
HT’s materials in Kyrgyz provided by ethnic Kyrgyz were able to reach the audience 
in northern regions of the country, including, Chuy, Bishkek and Naryn. In 
February 2007 the law enforcement arrested 11 members of HT who came from the 
south to Naryn to help rebuild the area hit by the earthquake. Despite that the 
party had been banned the leadership of the outlawed group shifted from closed 
secretive tactics to openly mass agitation via words and deeds to gain support. 
 
The government of President Bakiev was less tolerant of decent and more even so 
towards Islamists of any kind. The government banned headscarves in public 
schools, prevented school children from attending Friday prayers and extradited 
refugees from Uzbekistan. Bakiev’s policy reflected his own authoritarian style and 
attempted to please the regime of Uzbekistan which demanded from Bishkek to 
destroy Uzbek president’s critics residing in Kyrgyzstan when discussing the 
natural gas export. 
 
According to a leading expert on Islamist organizations in Kyrgyzstan Ikbaljan 
Mirsaitov, there are currently about 2,000 members of HT which is much less than 
the number cited by authorities.30 Some experts on HT in Kyrgyzstan, including 
official estimates, claim the party has 15,000 members in Kyrgyzstan and 20percent 
of them are representatives of various ethnic groups besides Uzbeks and Kyrgyz: 
Tatars, Russians, Chechens, Meskhetian Turks and others.31 The party has been 
																																								 																				
29 For more details on the conflict read the report of Human Right Center “Memorial” at 
http://www.memo.ru/2009/03/02/0203091.htm  
30 Mirsaitov, “Information on members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir is lifted up few fold,” 12 March 2009. 
available at: http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1236808020  






banned since 2003. 
 
According to Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 by the U.S. State Department, 
“Kyrgyz officials reported growing support for and bolder public outreach by HT. 
Supporters of terrorist groups the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) were also believed to maintain a presence in 
Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyz authorities alleged that both groups received material 
support from HT.”32 
 
Other Islamist Organizations Banned in Kyrgyzstan 
The Kyrgyz Government and other Central Asian states, members of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, all include the following ethnic Uyghur separatist groups 
in the list of Central Asian terrorist organizations: 
 
Sharqiy Turkestan Islamiy Harakati 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (a.k.a Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party; 
ETIM; ETIP) 
 
Sharqiy Turkestan Azatliq Teshkilati 
East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) 
 
China uses its power to curtail support for any Uyghur separatist group and 
ethnic Uyghurs from the local governments. The region has comparatively 
large economic influential Uyghur Diasporas, particularly in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan which share borders with China. 
 
Most of Uyghurs in Central Asia are disillusioned over the Chinese 
government’s policy towards approximately 18 million Turkic Muslims of the 
Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), historically known as Eastern 
Turkistan. Muslim ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan and from neighboring states 
are sympathetic with Uyghurs as they share common religion, culture and 
history viewing China’s presence as illegitimate while Central Asian leaders 
extradite “the enemies of Chinese State” without much investigation as to 
whether the person was actually involved in separatist, terrorist or extremist 
activities. In 2006, Huseyin Celil, a naturalized Canadian citizen of Uyghur 
origin who fled China in mid-1990s, has been sent back to the People’s 
Republic of China by the Uzbek authorities despite the protests of human 
rights organizations and the Canadian authorities. The extradition of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
political Islam in Kyrgyzstan), N Kurbanova, April 28, 2009, Centrasia.ru News Agency. Available 
at: 
http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1240897920 
32 Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, U.S. State Department, Chapter 2. Country Reports: South 











FOREIGN MILITARY BASES 
 
RUSSIAN MILITARY BASE IN KANT 
Located only 20 km from the capital Bishkek is the military base originally 
established in 1941 (after the invasion of German Nazi forces into the USSR) as a 
Soviet air force base. It also served as a military pilot training school for military air 
crews for the Soviet Air Force. 
 
The Russian-Kyrgyz agreement of 2003 authorized Russian military to rent the 
base for 15 years with a 5 year extension term. The Russian Federation spent US 
$2.6 million in upgrading the base in 2003 and intends to invest even more to 
reconstruct the runways which should be able to accept heavy TU-160 and TU-95 
(“Bear”) bombers. 
 
The airbase, under command of the Russian 5th Air Army based in Uralsk Military 
District, is also used by the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO], a 
security alliance of some post-Soviet states33 led by Russia aiming to foster its 
influence over the region. 
 
The Kant base phosts about 500 Russian troops, four L-39 combat training jets, two 
MI-8 combat transport helicopters, five  SU-25 attack aircrafts and five SU-27 
fighters and six IL-76 transport aircrafts. 
 
In late April of 2009 Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of CSTO, during a visit 
to Kyrgyzstan said that Russia's leadership plans to increase the number of 
military aircraft at Kant. He explained the decision is dictated by the situation in 
the region, including Afghanistan.34 
 
In late May of 2009 the Russian Government proposed 49 years long lease contract 
with 25 years of automatic prolongation if no sides decides to end the deal. The 
Kyrgyz side expressed its readiness to accept the offer. President Medvedev is to 
sign the document which will then be sent to Bishkek for consideration. 
 
Kyrgyzstan receives US$ 4,5 million and military and technical aid from Russia as 
a compensation for rent of the Kant base.35 
																																								 																				
33 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are members of 
this organization. There are rumors that Uzbekistan is considering to leave CSTO. 
34 “Russian will beef up Kyrgyz base,” April 21, 2009, The Moscow Times.com. Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/376415.htm 







US AIR BASE AT MANAS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
The US base was established in support of Operation “Enduring freedom” in 
December of 2001 on the territory of the Manas International Airport in the 
outskirts of capital Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan, threatened by Taliban’s expansion close to 
the borders of the former Soviet Central Asian states and in expectation of financial 
compensation, expressed its willingness to host the American and NATO forces 
targeting Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan.  The based was closed in 2014. 
 
American Manas Air Base was the home to the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing and 
approximately 1,000 military personnel from the United States, Spain and France 
were assigned to the wing, along with 650 U.S. and host-nation contractor 
personnel. Coalition aircrafts supporting the mission includes U.S. KC-135s, 
Spanish C-130s and French C135FRs.36 
 
On February 20, 2009 the Foreign Ministry of Kyrgyzstan delivered an official letter 
to the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek demanding the base to be closed within 6 months. 
Although Russian and Kyrgyz authorities deny the closure of the American base 
was the result of Russia’s financial assistance package promised to an impoverished 
country. Since the region depends heavily on foreign aid, many observers believe 
Russians promised to provide 2,150 million in loans to cement Moscow’s diplomatic 
efforts to oust the U.S. bases from the region. 
 
There were long negotiations between the United States and Kyrgyzstan interceded 
by Afghan President Karzai who asked Kyrgyz president to allow Americans to 
continue renting the base. The American side offered to pay a higher rent if the 
Kyrgyz government reconsiders its decision to evict US and NATO troops. 
 
In result of the extensive talks between the two sides the agreement was reached: 
the military base was turn into a cargo transit center of non-military items into 
Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz government agreed to use the Manas airport in exchange 
for higher rent in the amount of US$ 60 million and aid to Kyrgyzstan in the 
amount of US $41. 5 million.37 The base as suggested in 2014 was closed in 2014. 
 
During the meeting between Russian President Medvedev and President Obama in 
Moscow in early July Moscow the deal was signed that will allow U.S. military 
cargo aircrafts to overfly Russian airspace and transit overland necessary military 
and non-military deliveries to Afghanistan which most probably will lead to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Available at:        http://defense-technologynews.blogspot.com/2009/05/dtn-news-russian-govt-
approves-kyrgyz.html  
36 More information on the US Manas Air base can be obtained from its official web site: 
http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/ 
37 “МК": С "Ганси" выдачи нет. Киргизия заработала на одной базе дважды, Igor Karmazin, Moskovskiy 






Kyrgyzstan’s permission to transport military shipments despite “non- military 





There are currently several important internal and external developments which 
will influence the security situation in the country: 
 
Internal Developments External Developments 
1. Presidential Election in October 
2017 
1.   Political/security situation in 
Afghanistan 
2. Criminalization of Politics 2.   Kyrgyz—Uzbek relations 
3. Sharpened tensions between 
powerful political and business 
elites 
 
4. Return of a large army of labor 
migrants to put additional 





Criminalization of Politics 
Employing criminal groups by the new leadership that needed broader public 
support and access to economic resources in early stages of Bakiev’s realm led to 
legitimization of some powerful criminal figures attempting to dominate politics and 
state assets. While Kurmanbek Bakiev was president the killings and unresolved 
mysterious deaths of politicians and journalists became a part of political life in the 
country. In the first two years after the Tulip Revolution contract killings took the 
lives of 25 famous public figures, including businessmen, politicians, a famous actor 
and a well known sportsman.38 
 
On April 4, 2009 the murder of the fifth parliamentarian within last four years 
sparked a lot of debate and claims within the Kyrgyz society about President 
Bakiev’s close ties with the criminal world: Tashbolot Baltabaev, a leading member 
of the opposition party ‘Ata Meken’ and a parliamentarian, suspects that “The 
criminal world and [political] power go hand in hand, and that is regarded as being 
in the order of things.” He further warns that “… the shootouts and contract killings 
will continue.”39 
																																								 																				
38 “Kyrgyzstan: Impediments to State-Building,” Johan Engvall, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-
A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=34004  







List of individuals involved in politics killed/dead/disappeared since 2005: 
1. Parliamentarian Sanjarbek Kadyraliev, killed outside his home on April 14, 
2009 by an unidentified lone gunman who shot him once in the back of the 
head. Politician and businessman Kadyraliev was close to the president and 
belonged to pro-presidential political party Ak Zhol (White Path). Kadyraliev 
is known for his criminal past when he confronted another gang group leader 
in the south Bayaman Erkinbayev who was also MP. Many believe 
Kadyraliev is responsible for the assassination of his major mafia rival 
Erkinbayev. 
2. Former head of the president’s administration Medet Sadyrkulov was killed 
in a car incident on March 13, 2009. The investigation is under way. Some 
opposition  figures  accused  the  government  in  organizing  the  car  crash  
to eliminate an influential politician who joined the opponents of President 
Bakiev and a former presidential aide who knew “too much” about his former 
boss.40 
3. The political observer of ‘Reporter – Bishkek’ independent newspaper Syrgak 
Abdyldaev was knifed on March 3, 2009 by unidentified individuals. The 
journalist produced critical reports about the government’s policies which 
many observers believe became the reason for the authorities’ vendetta 
against Abdyldaev. He is in critical conditions. 
4. Parliamentarian Ruslan Shabatoev a member of the opposition Social 
Democratic Party, disappeared in late of 2008. The police investigation 
produced no results. 
5. A well-known journalist for Voice of America Alisher Saipov (an ethnic 
Uzbek) was shot outside of his office in Osh in late October 2007. He is 
believed to be have been killed by Uzbek National Security Service on the 
territory of Kyrgyzstan for critical reporting about Uzbek president with 
illicit approval of President Bakiev. This was inn exchange for a better 
natural gas supply deal from Uzbekistan for natural gas hungry Kyrgyzstan. 
6. In August of 2006 the Kyrgyz security service officers shot a famous Imam 
Rafiq Qori Kamoluddin, an ethnic Uzbek preacher whose mosque attracted 
up to 10,000 people at a Friday prayer in the border city of Kara-Suu. Imam 
was well known for his criticism of Karimov’s foreign and internal policies. 
Qori Kamoluddin’s supporters believe he was killed by the Kyrgyz troops but 
on the request from an Uzbek counterpart. 
7. Chairman of the Kyrgyz parliament's committee for legal affairs, defense and 
law and order Tynychbek Akmatbaev was shot dead in Moldavanovka prison 
near the capital on October 22, 2005 when he tried to pacify prisoners’ protest 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
and Ayday Tokonova, RCA, No.573, April 16, 2009, Available at: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=351794&apc_state=henprca  
40 Read ‘Kyrgyz Politician’s Death Widens Opposition-Government Gulf,’ Institute for War & Peace 







against bad conditions in Kyrgyz jail. Experts on Kyrgyz politics believe the 
newly appointed president relied on support of Tynychbek Akmatbaev’s 
brother Rysbek who was allegedly a mafia baron in the north of the country 
where southerner President Bakiev had little support. Prime Minister Kulov 
had an alliance with the rival underworld gang leader Azizbek Batukaev, an 
ethnic Chechen accused in killing MP Akmatbaev who also had ties with the 
criminal world in the past. The conflict between two powerful criminal groups 
led to conflict between President Bakiev and then Prime Minister Kulov 
which indicates the ability of influential criminal figures to project power on 
the government. Following the death of Tynychbek his brother, a mafia baron 
Rysbek,  became    MP  after  being  cleared  of  triple  homicide.  During  
Akaev presidency Rysbek Akmatbaev was wanted on a list of charges at 
home but President Bakiev’s alleged support for Rysbek set the notorious 
criminal and his six accomplices free of all charges. In May of 2006 mafia 
boss and newly elected MP Rysbek Akmatbaev was shot dead in outskirts of 
capital Bishkek, however there were rumors that he is alive but faked his 
assassination. 
8. Bayaman Erkinbayev, a member of the Kyrgyz parliament since 1995 and a 
supporter of President Akaev who was also known as a leader of a powerful 
criminal group in the south, did not survive the third assassination attempt. 
Bishkek died on September 21 and various explanations were rumored about 
who killed Erkinbayev but the law enforcement offered no credible 
conclusions of the official investigation. Some experts believe Erkinbayev was 
killed by a rival criminal group that tried to seize the strategic economic 
asset - Kara-Suu bazaar on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border which brought lucrative 
profits to  the owner of this market. Others suspect the new political 
leadership got rid of a pro-Akaev politician and a powerful gang leader to 
control the rich resources of the southern region. By installing new criminal 
leaders loyal to a new government the president ensures political support in 
the south and access to wealth for his family. 
9. Parlamentarian Jyrgalbek Surabaldiev, who was known for his sympathy 
with former president Akaev, was killed by unidentified gunmen on June 10, 
2005 in the centre of Bishkek. The assailants have not been found. MP 
Surabaldiev head of the “Union of Entrepreneurs –New Step” and a powerful 
businessman was also suspected in having ties with criminal groups that 
caused suspicion that criminal groups behind then Acting President Bakiev 
were redistributing resources and eliminating competitors. This is the first 
case of an MP murder in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
A well recognized expert on Kyrgyzstan Erica Marat says new hybrids of 
power relations developed within the state after the Tulip Revolution, 
“Common economic interests between criminal and political actors merged 
within the state apparatus. Both groups could operate in sync in maintaining 






enjoying legal status.”41 
 
Many observers claim Bakiev’s family members are involved in illegal 
business activities occupying important positions in the government while 
formally engaging in the private sector. Many Kyrgyzstanis say that Bakiev’s 
family is much larger than of the former president (Askar Akaev has no 
brothers; Bakiev has seven brothers) and therefore the current president and 
his family has significantly higher financial and political appetite.42 
 
Local and foreign journalists cite that businessman Maxim Bakiev, 
President’s younger son whose nickname is ‘prince”, is connected to the 
criminal world and engaged in extortion and other illegal economic crimes.43 
The famous case of Maxim’s efforts to seize a profitable TV Radio company 
‘Pyramida’ in December of 2005 symbolized the aims and tactics of President 
Bakiev’s family clan. These are more dangerous than of the family of former 
President Akaev. 
 
Despite that Maxim denies his involvement in politics and claims he’s only a 
businessman there are allegations of Maxim’s political pressure on his 
father’s opponents. Former head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) 
Klara Kabilova in a video address to citizens of Kyrgyzstan44 accused Maksim 
Bakiev of threatening her in front of employees. This threat was made in 
front of employees of the CEC one week before the elections for 491 city and 
town council positions.45 
 
There were rumors that Bakiev’s brother Janybek (more often called Janysh) 
is controlling drug trafficking in the south. In 2006 Janysh was fired as 
deputy head of the National Security Service after the parliament learned he 
was helping his brother to get rid of powerful critics. Janysh allegedly 
																																								 																				
41 “The State Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” Erica Marat, Silk Road Paper, October 2006, p. 93. Available at: 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0610EMarat.pdf  
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ordered the deputy head of Manas International Airport to plant drugs in the 
luggage of highly respected Parliamentarian Tekebaev who was travelling to 
Poland in 2006.46 Since his brother acme president Major General Janybek 
Bakiev has installed many corrupt police officers on key positions in law 
enforcement in the south to arrange the smooth delivery of drugs.47 
 
In general crimes of various types are on the rise. According to statistics from 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as of February of 2009, 2,600 crimes were 
reported which is 5.1 percent higher than in February of 2008 and 18.6 
percent higher than the previous month. Murder rate increased to 14.8 
percent from February 2008 to February of 2009; an increase is also cited for 
other type of offenses: rape up 3.8 percent, hooliganism up 1.7 percent; 
burglary up 3.9 percent and economic crimes up 1.4 percent.48 
 
Anara Tabyshalieva, a well - established specialist on Kyrgyz politics, 
claimed that there were 24 known organized criminal groups and four 
criminal networks in the country in 2006.49 
 
President Bakiev’s attempts to strengthen his grip on power and secure his re- 
election in July of 2009 were managed by his family members and friends 
occupying lucrative positions in the government and seizing maximum assets 
from the private sector. More than former president Akaev the current president 
relies on services of the criminal authorities in pacifying resistance to his 
political and financial advancement throughout the country. Although the nexus 
between the political elite and the criminal groups existed before the 2005 Tulip 
Revolution, the mafia barons have never been as influential as they are now. 
This threatens the country by shifting the balance towards further 
criminalization of state institutions and monopolizing the economic policies 
which ultimately lead to turning the republic into a criminal state.  Interim 
government formed and in 2011 Almazbek Atambayev elected President.  




46 For details on this case read “Kyrgyzstan Rocked by Smear Scandal,” Institute for War & Peace 
Reporting, RCA No. 463, 12-Sep-06, at 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=323794&apc_state=henirca2006  
47 “Narkotiki vygodnee amerikanskoy bazy” (Drugs are more profitable than American base), 
Positsiya.ru Internet news agency, April 24, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.posit.kz/?lan=ru&id=105&pub=23920  
48 Kyrgyz Respublikasynyn sotsialdyk-ekonomikalyk abaly (Social-economic situation in Kyrgyz 
Republic), January – February 2009, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyz Republic, Monthly 
Publication, Bishkek 2009, Section Prestupnost’ (Crime), pp. 110-111. Report is available in Kyrgyz 
and Russian at: http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/doclad/obzor2.pdf  
49 See “Political violence on the rise in Kyrgyzstan,” Anara Tabyshalieva, 01/25/2006 issue of the 






Sharpened Tensions between Powerful Political and Business Elites 
The 2005 Tulip Revolution disrupted the inter-clan equilibrium established during 
the Akaev era and triggered the attention of political and business elites whose 
well-being depends on new parity between the players. 
Surprisingly even for opposition leaders to Akaev, their bet on Kurmanbek Bakiev 
brought disillusionment when the new president dismantled the old king and now 
tries to become a new one. 
 
The emergence of new people in the political and business arena associated with the 
new president and their gains at the expense of the old powerful figures is still an 
ongoing process and needs careful attention. Resource are scarce and the country 
cannot satisfy economic demands of all interested parties while general socio-
economic conditions of the common people do not improve. The  traditional thirst for 
political power in Kyrgyz society is explained by the centralized distribution of 
resources by the executive branch with the private sector largely dependent on ties 
with powerful politicians.  Therefore access to political power gives access to 
economic resources and exemption from the law. 
 
Issue of Returning Labor Migrants 
Up to 300,000 Kyrgyzstan’s labor migrants are expected to return from Russia and 
Kazakhstan in 2009. The influx of a large number of unemployed who will need jobs 
or welfare is a serious concern for national and local authorities. The population 
heavily suffering from unemployment and low wages now will face even further 
social problems and economic hardships.  People also expect a price increase for 
major food items like bread and flour of 15-20 percent. Housing services are 
expected to increase up to 45 percent.50 
 
EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Kyrgyzstan’s security and economic conditions are subject to a significant influence 
from external relations with next door neighbors, regional and global players. Poor 
in natural resources and technologically disadvantaged, a nation is isolated from 
seaports and dependant on neighbors for communication and energy and totally 
reliant on larger players like Russia and China for security.  At this moment of the 
history Kyrgyz Republic faces challenges in relations with Uzbekistan and has 
growing concerns over the situation in Afghanistan. 
 
Political/security situation in Afghanistan 
Starting 1999 the Kyrgyz Republic has been affected by the instability in 
Afghanistan. During the conflict between the Northern Alliance and Taliban, 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in an attempt to overthrow the regime of 
President Karimov in Uzbekistan, tried to infiltrate southern Batken province on 
their way to Uzbekistan. Uzbek Islamists also crossed Kyrgyz border and clashed 
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with the law enforcement in 2000 and 2006. Kyrgyz military is underequipped and 
poorly trained which makes it incapable defending the republic from external 
threats. Kyrgyzstan heavily relies on security and military aid from Russia, China 
and the U.S. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan views southern Kyrgyzstan, 
which is a part of the Ferghana Valley, as a recruiting ground for support and an 
integral part of the Islamic state they aim to build in Central Asia. 
 
Incursions of Central Asian Islamist groups linked with Taliban and Al-Qaida into 
Kyrgyzstan and other states of the region might intensify due to military operations 
against Taliban and Al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Authorities of 
Kyrgyzstan claimed on June 23, 2009 the units of Kyrgyz National Security 
Committee clashed with and killed 5 well trained and equipped fighters of Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan in a private house full of explosives and ammunition in 
Tashbulak settlement of Suzak District of Jalal-Abad province neighboring with 
Uzbekistan – the prime target of IMU and IJU.51 The Kyrgyz officials identified the 
militants but refused to announce the names but admitted they are not citizens of 
Uzbekistan and belong to IMU.52 Although the Kyrgyz officials believe the Islamist 
group linked with Taliban was IMU it is possible that the five member group 
identified in Ferghana Valley was a cell of Islamic Jihad Union fighters which 




The relations between the two have a significant impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economic 
development and security. Several important issues impede healthy relations 
between the neighbors: water distribution, hydro-electric stations, border 
demarcation, and water supply. 
 
Water Distribution 
Water sharing between upstream countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on 
one side and downstream states Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
on the other side becomes a cornerstone issue for regional stability. Decrease 
of water levels, mainly coming from Syr Darya and Amy Darya and 
continuous growth of water consumption due to increase of population in the 
region, Kyrgyzstan’s (Kambarata -1 and Kambarata -2) and Tajikistan’s 
(Rogun) plans to build giant hydro-electric stations are of great concern for 
downstream countries. These issues along with the Aral Sea disaster are 
serious problems the leaders from five states have enormous difficulties to 
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The Kyrgyz authorities seem to be very determined to build the gigantic 
Kambarata hydroelectric stations despite strong resentment from Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. Addressing the meeting with NGOs in Bishkek on May 5 
President Bakiev announced: "We will build the Kambarata hydroelectric 
power stations in Kyrgyzstan whether one likes it or not."53 
 
Kyrgyzstan tries to establish the new terms for water, which should be 
treated as commodity with a price set by upstream countries. Uzbekistan 
strongly objects  to this notion and demands that water be treated as a 
common good for the  entire region. 
 
Uzbekistan, for lack of payment, cuts supply of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan 
during the winter season. The Kyrgyz hydro- energy sector has to let water 
run through the Toktogul Dam to generate power but this causes flooding in 
Uzbekistan which experiences shortage of water during the summer season. 
The Kyrgyz side is frustrated that Uzbekistan sells natural gas to 
Kyrgyzstan at almost world price (US $240 per 1,000 cubic meters) without 
any discount. Also not allowing Bishkek to use its internal hydro energy 
capacity, the Kyrgyz authorities have to maintain water reservoirs to hold 
water until summer for downstream states. 
  
 
Tashkent’s view is that natural gas is a commodity and requires investment 
into production, transportation and maintenance of pipelines while water is a 
God given resource running from the Mother Earth’s mountains to all and 
upstream countries should not take control of this common good. 
 
Border Demarcation 
On April 19, 2009 approximately 40 police and border patrol troops of 
Uzbekistan illegally entered Kyrgyz territory and searched homes of 
residents in the village of Chek of Jalal-Abad province. The Uzbek officers 
behaved rudely claiming they were conducting anti-terrorism operations. 
 
Then-Kyrgyz Prime Minister Chudinov informed the parliament that 80 
percent of Uzbek-Kyrgyz border is agreed to. The remaining 20 percent is a 
difficult portion of areas in Kugart, Shahimardan, Sokh enclave and few 
other places. The Prime Minister explained that the border agreement is 
complicated due to conflicting documents and maps that mark the border of 
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Central Asian states first in 1924 and then in 1956.54 
 
This border incident highlighted the importance and urgency of resolving the 
border demarcation issue. The unfinished demarcation of the border often 
sparks local conflicts between Uzbek law enforcement and Kyrgyz residents. 
 
Amid the attacks of Islamic Jihad Union fighters on law enforcement 
facilities and 2 suicide attacks on police officers in Andijan and Khanabad 
cities on May 26, 2009 near Uzbek –Kyrgyz border in volatile Ferghana 
Valley, the Uzbek government ordered digging 3 meters wide and 3 meters 
(in some areas, such as Madaniyat, Bekabad - up to 5 meters) deep trenches 
along the border. Along some border areas such as Chek-2 the Uzbek 
authorities remove the houses of locals in order to create a buffer zone to 
protect the border - the Uzbek authorities fear new incursions of Islamic 
militants into Uzbekistan from Kyrgyz territory.  One sided security measure 
of the Uzbek side triggered frustration in Bishkek which view the unfriendly 
action of neighbor as illegal since the both sided have not completed the 
delimitation process. 
 
Inflexible and unfriendly border policy of the Uzbek government have caused 
obstacles for trade, water supply, travel and even led to a death of a local 
trader. On June 7, 2009 Ulug Usmanov, an ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan 
was shot by Uzbek border guards when he tried to cross the border into 
Uzbekistan in the point not designated for trespassing near the commercial 
town of Karasuu. The Uzbek authorities seized the body of the killed 29 years 
old resident of the border town and had not returned it to relatives for several 
days. Ulug Usmanov and many other local traders used to cross the Uzbek 
border to buy fruits and vegetables and other food stuffs and return to 
Kyrgyzstan after paying bribes to Uzbek border guards but this time he 
became a victim of Tashkent’s barbaric treatment of local residents living in 
the valley that linked three republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. Even when the Soviets formally introduced borders between these 
brotherly nations, locals would travel without restrictions. 
 
Gas Supply 
Power cuts for many hours during winter season threaten the government’s 
ability to provide energy. Energy is critical and a matter of survival for any 
regime in power in Bishkek. Every year the Kyrgyz authorities face 
uncertainty about Tashkent’s willingness to sell the volume needed for 
Kyrgyzstan and annual increase of price for this strategic commodity. 
 
																																								 																				
54 “Igor Chudinov: 80 protsentov granitsy Kyrgyzstana s Uzvekistanom soglasovany” (Igor Chudinov: 
80 percent of Uzbek-Kyrgyz border is agreed upon), Nargiza Yuldasheva, Information Agency “24kg”, 






In 2009 the price of natural gas from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan was set at US 
$ 240 per 1,000 cubic meters while Uzbekistan was demanding US$ 300 and 
the 2009 price is US$ 95 higher than in 2008.  Irregularities with timely 










LINKS TO NEWS AND RESOURCES ON KYRGZSTAN/CENTRAL ASIA 
 
Official Sources 






Ministry of the Foreign Affairs 
www.mfa.kg  
 
Ministry of Finance 
www.minfin.kg  
 
State Customs Committee 
www.customs.gov.kg  
 
State Committee for taxes and fees 
www.sti.gov.kg  
 
State National News Agency “Kabar 
www.kabar.kg  
 
Kyrgyz Diplomatic Services 
http://www.kds.kg/main_en.html  
 
State Committee on State Property 
www.spf.gov.kg  
 
News Agency “Gazeta.kg” 
www.gazeta.kg  
 
News Agency “24.kg” 
www.24.kg  
 
News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in English, Russian and Uzbek: 
Information Agency Ferghana.ru: 
http://www.ferghana.ru/   
 












News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in Russian: 
Russian news web site Centrasia.ru: 
http://www.centrasia.ru/  
 
FreeDoilnanet, radio news in Russian, Uzbek and Kyrgyz: 
http://www.freedolina.net/   
 
News of Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in English 






Institute for War & Peace Reporting: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=346738&apc_state=henprca  
 












Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Analyst: 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/  
 
News on Kyrgyzstan in Kyrgyz only 
RFE/RL in Kyrgyz: 
http://www.azattyk.kg/  
 


















International Crisis Group: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1251&l=1  
 
Russian and Eurasian Security Network: 
http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/sw/index.cfm  
 
National Bureau of Asian Research: 
http://www.nbr.org/  
 
RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy: 
http://www.rand.org/international_programs/capp/pubs/central.html   
 
OFFICIAL WEBSITES OF MINISTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Regional International Organizations 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 
http://www.sectsco.org/  
 
Eurasian Economic Community: 
http://www.evrazes.com/  
 
Collective Security Treaty Organization: 
http://www.dkb.gov.ru/  
